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Baltic countries, Currency crisis
The global financial crisis and the dramatic slump in private capital flows associated 
with it has particularly affected the economies of the Baltic countries. The real gross 
domestic product decreased in the first half of 2009 in Latvia by 18.8 percent, in 
Estonia by 15.7 percent and in Lithuania by 11 percent. In the run-up to the current 
crisis, these countries had a high percentage of bank-related capital inflows that was 
mostly used for the financing of very high current account deficits. Currently, due to 
their fixed currency exchange systems and due to the lack of a possibility to create 
fiscal momentum, the Baltic countries only have limited economic scope of action. The 
situation of the public budgets is particularly tense in Latvia. Early warning indica-
tors point to an imminent currency crisis in Latvia. A devaluation would improve the 
competitiveness of the country, but due to the high amount of credits given in foreign 
currencies, it would lead to large-scale domestic credit failures. A strong devaluation 
could also have negative effects on the two other Baltic countries. The example of the 
Baltic States shows how problematic a development strategy that is based on a high 
degree of foreign capital inflows actually is. 
The global financial crisis quickly affected the Baltic countries. In 2008 there was 
already a considerable decrease in the gross domestic product in Latvia (-4.6 per-
cent) and in Estonia (-3.6 percent) (Figure 1). In Lithuania the overall economic 
growth rate decreased to three percent after it was at nine percent during 2007.1 
The economic crash continued in an accelerated fashion in the first half of 2009 
(Estonia -15.7 percent, Lithuania -11 percent and Latvia with even -18.8 percent). 
The outlooks remain dismal. The economic performance is expected to retreat by 
more than an average of twelve percent during 2009.2 The entire economic produc-
tion in the Baltic States will also decline in 2010. 
The crisis not only led to strong decreases in production, but rather has managed to 
make its way to the employment market in the meantime. In July 2009, according to 
Eurostat, the statistical office of the EU, the unemployment rate in Estonia reached 
13.3 percent, 16.7 percent in Lithuania and 17.4 percent in Latvia; compared to the 
previous year, these rates more than doubled.  
1 International Monetary Fund: World Economic Outlook Database. April 2009.
2 Cf. among others Eastern Europe Consensus Forecasts. June 2009.The Baltic States: No end to the crisis in sight
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The Baltic States, particularly 
susceptible to the crisis
In the run-up to the international financial crisis, the 
Baltic countries exhibited a few characteristics:
very high current account deficits and in- •	
creasing foreign indebtedness,
disproportionately high shares of bank-re- •	
lated capital inflows in the gross domestic 
product, both in the European and world-
wide comparison. These capital invest-
ments can be deducted faster than other 
investments, 
high share of credits issued in foreign  •	
currency within the countries.
Shortly before the global financial crisis, the coun-
tries exhibited a high economic trend. The growth 
rate of the real gross domestic product for the Baltic 
countries from 2001 to 2007 was at an average of 
seven to eight percent. It was thus higher than most of 
the new members of the European Union.3 The trend 
resulted from a strong increase in private domestic 
demand and this was accompanied by increasing 
current account deficits (Figure 2). Particularly pro-
nounced was the deficit from 2007 with 23 percent 
of the gross domestic product in Latvia, followed 
by Estonia (18 percent) and Lithuania (15 percent). 
Compared to the Baltic States, the deficits are lower 
in most other Eastern European member states.4
The enormous current account deficits 
were mainly financed by foreign banks.
Their subsidiaries took credits from their parent com-
panies and then issued them to private households 
and companies. The great importance of foreign 
banks as creditors can be seen in the development of 
the cross-border claims from the (European) banks 
reporting to the Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS). At the end of 2008, the consolidated receiva-
bles compared to the Baltic countries amounted 
to 98 billion USD. Here 30 percent was allotted 
to Estonia, 36 percent to Latvia and 34 percent to 
Lithuania. Of the claims against the Baltic econo-
mies, European banks hold nearly 100 percent. The 
main creditors are Swedish banks with a proportion 
of more than two thirds, followed by German credit 
institutions with less than ten percent. Possible bad 
debt losses would mainly affect Swedish banks.
3 The economic performance of the Baltic States was nowhere near rea-
ching the average of the EU. Measured according to this average, Estonia 
with 72 percent has advanced the most among the Baltic countries, follo-
wed by Lithuania with 60 percent and Latvia with 58 percent.
4 An exception is Bulgaria. The percentage here reached 25 percent.
Foreign, particularly Scandinavian banks also pur-
chased shares in Eastern European banks and es-
tablished subsidiaries in the Baltic countries in the 
course of the transformation. Measured according to 
the assets, the share of foreign banks is particularly 
high in Estonia (98.7 percent), followed by Lithuania 
(91.7 percent) and Latvia (63.8 percent).5
5 As of the end of 2007. Cf. EBRD: Structural Change Indicators. www. 
ebrd.com/country/sector/econo/stats/index.htm.
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Figure 2
Current account deficits in the Baltic 
States
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The credits to private households have increased 
even more quickly in the past few years compared 
to corporate credits (Figure 3).6 In the period of time 
from 2004 to 2008, residential construction loans 
had a greater significance than consumer credits. 
Despite strongly increasing available income in pri-
vate households, the rate of indebtedness of private 
households has increased.7
A majority of the credits are nominated in foreign 
currencies, even though the households and compa-
nies did not receive any income in foreign currency. 
Foreign currency credits are connected with a spe-
cific failure risk: in the case of a devaluation of the 
local currency, credit repayment in local currency 
becomes more expensive for domestic creditors. 
The share of credits in foreign currencies at the end 
of 2008 amounted to 88.4 percent in Latvia, 85.1 
percent in Estonia and 60 percent in Lithuania. The 
most important foreign currency in this context is 
the Euro.
In the Baltic countries, the overall external debt has 
increased in the past few years (Figure 4). By the 
end of 2008, the debt level in Latvia had grown to 
42 billion USD, to 32.5 billion USD in Lithuania 
and to 27.4 billion USD in Estonia. This corresponds 
to a debt ratio of 124 percent in Latvia, 118 percent 
in Estonia and 68 percent in Lithuania. 
Limited economic leeway 
The Baltic countries have a fixed currency ex-
change rate regime tied to the Euro. A “currency 
board” exists in Estonia and Latvia. Latvia has a 
fixed exchange rate system with a degree of fluc-
tuation from the Euro of merely one percent. The 
planned introduction of the Euro in Estonia for 2008 
and Latvia for 2009 had to be delayed because the 
countries could not fulfill the inflation goal—one of 
the convergence criteria. Now, 2010 (Estonia) and 
2012/2013 (Latvia) are planned. Lithuania had also 
initially intended to introduce the Euro on January 
1, 2010.
6 The ratio of credits in the private sector to the gross domestic product, 
which amounted to less than 30 percent at the end of 2002 in the Baltic 
countries, increased until 2007 to just under 60 percent for Lithuania, 90 
percent in Estonia and 94 percent in Latvia. An increasing percentage 
of credits in the gross domestic product during the transformation is a 
typical phenomenon. However, the ratio of credits in the private sector to 
the gross domestic product in the other Eastern European member states 
at the end of 2007 was much lower – with the exception of Slovenia (79 
percent).
7 From 2002 to 2008, the available incomes grew in the Baltic States  by 
an average of 12 percent per year. The increase in 2007 in Latvia with 
over 20 percent was particularly remarkable. In fall 2008, the percen-
tage of debts from the available income of private households in Estonia 
reached 84.3 percent and thus increased considerably in the past few 
years (end of 2002: 25.7 percent). See OECD: Estonia, OECD Economic 
Surveys. April 2009.
Due to their fixed exchange rates, the Baltic coun-
tries can barely implement their own monetary poli-
cies. The domestic money supply must be covered 
by foreign currency. Thus, the economic control is 
constricted to fiscal policies. The Baltic countries, 
however, also have their hands tied here. Their 
planned entrance into the Euro Zone requires the 
Figure 3
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fulfillment of the Maastricht criteria. This requires 
that new indebtedness does not exceed three percent 
of the gross domestic product and that the federal 
indebtedness may not be more than 60 percent of 
the gross domestic product.
Precarious situation in Latvia 
Particularly in Latvia, the situation of the public 
budget is very tense due to the decreased incomes 
and increasing expenditures. At the beginning of 
2009, a memorandum of understanding (MoU) 
was concluded between Latvia and the EU, which 
designated financial assistance of 3.1 billion EUR 
with a term of seven years.8 Due to the intensifying 
situation, the MoU was modified on July 13 and the 
deficit limits for the next three years were raised.9 
Accordingly, the budget deficit in 2009 should not 
exceed ten percent of the gross domestic product 
(previously 5.3 percent) and should be reduced to 
three percent of the gross domestic product by 2012 
(previously 2011).
8 The financial assistance was provided in connection with the credit 
from the IWF amounting to 1.5 billion special drawing rights (around 1.7 
billion EUR).
9 In June 2009, federal bonds could no longer be placed onto the mar-
ket.
The agreement made in July 2009 with the IWF 
about a tranche of 278 million USD provides for 
further decreases in expenditures from the public 
sector and tax increases in Latvia. The financial 
support does give Latvia a break with regard to the 
devaluation pressure, however, it does not solve the 
complex overall economic problems. 
In addition to this, not only the balance of current 
accounts was in deficit in Latvia, but also the bal-
ance of direct and portfolio investments and the 
financial derivatives in the fourth quarter of 2008. 
Against this background, the international reserves 
decreased considerably. The pressure on local cur-
rency thus continued to increase.10
Risk of a currency crisis in Latvia ...
An approach used multiple times in the literature 
for the early recognition of currency crises is the 
“Early Warning Signals Approach” developed by 
Kaminsky et al.11 Based on a variety of macroeco-
10 The Latvian currency reserves decreased by more than 35 percent du-
ring the period of time from September 2008 to the end of June 2009. Cf. 
Bank of Latvia www.bank.lv/eng/main/all/statistics/imf/sdds/arres/
index. php?93776.
11 Kaminsky, G., Lizondo, S., Reinhart, C. M.: Leading Indicators of Curren-
cy Crises. The World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 1852, No-
Box
Early warning indicators of currency 
crisis
The early warning indicators used by Kaminsky 
et al. were developed within the course of the 
Asian crisis in 1997 and have been applied to 
a variety of other currency crises. The studied 
indicators – this deals with change rates, with 
the exception of interest rates – can be roughly 
classified into five groups. For every indicator, a 
critical region is determined. This is based on the 
experiences with currency crises in a variety of 
countries. The critical region corresponds to the 
upper or lower percentile in which the value of 
the observed indicator deviates considerably from 
its normal value (table).
The threshold tells in the first step whether a sig-
nal is being sent. In a further step, the strength 
of the individual signals and the point in time of 
their transmission are determined. The signals are 
stronger if they are higher or lower in the critical 
region. The weight of a signal is stronger the more 
recent the transmission was sent.
Indicators
  Critical region
Overborrowing circles







Real exchange rate 10
Problems Capital  Account
International reserves 15
M2 to reserves  13
Real interest differential 11




Domestic real interest rate 12
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Stock prices 11
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nomic and financial indicators, warning signals prior 
to currency crises are determined. It is assumed that 
these indicators act differently before a currency 
crisis than they would if no crisis were imminent. 
Thus, it is assumed that the warning signals are 
transmitted as soon as the indicators deviate con-
siderably from their “normal value” and exceed the 
pre-defined thresholds (Box).
The early warning signals were calculated for Latvia 
using the introduced indicators and the specific 
threshold values for the period of time from 1994 
to May 2009.12 This roughly results in the follow-
ing image:
The various indicators do not send any or only 
relatively weak alarm signals for the interest rates. 
Presently there is no alarm signal being transmitted 
from the indicators of imports, domestic credits to 
gross domestic product and foreign indebtedness. 
This is due to the fact that Latvia’s indebtedness has 
not increased any more. The average signal strength 
is being transmitted from the indicator “bank depos-
its”. The decrease in bank deposits points to a loss 
in trust; however, the signal is weaker than it was 
during the Latvian bank crisis of 1995. 
Strong alarm signals are being transmitted from the 
indicators for exports, industrial production, the M2 
multiplier, M2/reserves, international reserves, the 
real exchange rate and stock prices. This has been 
the case for the real currency rates and exports since 
fall 2008 and for reserves since winter 2008. The 
variety of strong, partially long-lasting signals sug-
gests an imminent currency crisis in Latvia.
The “composite” indicator, which is made up of the 
individual indicators and clearly shows an intensifi-
cation in the summer of 2009 (Figure 5).
... but infection effects are rather 
minimal  
A currency crisis in Latvia could have negative ef-
fects on the other two Baltic countries. There are 
basically three channels of contagion for currency 
crises:13
vember 1997 and Kaminsky, G.: Currency and Banking Crisis: The Early 
Warnings of Distress. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 
International Finance Discussion Paper No. 629, October1998.
12 Not all indicators were available for the entire period of time. Data 
about foreign indebtedness were only available for December 2008. The-
re has only been information on the stock prices since September 2003.
13 Cf. Roubini, N.,Setser, B.: Bailouts or Bail-Ins? Responding to Financial 
Crisis in Emerging Economies. Washington DC 2004.
Financial interlinkages •	
Trade linkages •	
“Wake up calls” •	
The financial interlinkages of Latvia can be seen in 
the observation of the consolidated net claims from 
foreign banks against Latvia.14 Of these claims, 
about 53 percent was allotted to Swedish banks in 
2008, followed by Germany with just under eleven 
percent. Claims from banks in other countries play 
an unimportant role. The Swedish banks active in 
Latvia are also active in the other two Baltic coun-
tries. Problems with Latvian banks could thus be 
transferred to Estonia and Lithuania through the 
Swedish parent banks. According to the Swedish 
National Bank (The Riksbank), the credit failures of 
the three large Swedish banks with business in the 
Baltic States amounted to 40 percent of the entire 
credit failures in the first quarter.15
In a scenario until the end of 2010, the largest 
bad debts are to be expected in the Baltic States. 
Nevertheless, due to their good capitalization, it is 
assumed that the banks will be able to cope with 
the burden. However, the large uncertainty of the 
scenario is emphasized in the stress test.
Another channel of contagion includes trade link-
ages. Latvia’s most important trade partners are 
14 This deals with foreign banks that report to the Bank for International 
Settlements. Cf. for a list of the countries of origin Bank of International 
Settlement: Quarterly Review. June 2009. 
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Lithuania, Germany, Russia and Estonia. Trade with Latvia has little importance for 
the large economies of Germany and Russia. In contrast, Estonia and Lithuania’s 
trade with Latvia has a respectable portion of the entire trade volume so that de-
valuation of the Latvian currency could have a negative impact on Estonia and 
Lithuania. This applies even more as it could lead to a “wake up call” in the Baltic 
countries because of their similar problems (including high current account deficits). 
Signals of a currency crisis in one country would then cause investors to not only 
withdraw their investments from the affected country, but also from countries with 
similar characteristics. 
Conclusion
In the years from 2000 to 2007, Latvia achieved the highest gross domestic product 
growth rate in the European Union. The growth of Estonia and Lithuania was also 
far above the European average during this period of time. The decline of interna-
tional capital inflows in light of the global financial crisis had an extremely strong 
impact on the Baltic countries, particularly Latvia. Compared to other European 
countries, the outlook for the Baltic countries is dismal for the next few years. 
Should there actually be a currency crisis in Latvia, the chances of an upswing 
taking place in the Baltic States anytime soon would worsen. The example of the 
Baltic States shows that a development strategy that relies on high capital inflows 
depends greatly on the worldwide investment climate and is thus very fragile. This 
strategy is particularly problematic because the Baltic countries do not have much 
political leeway in order to counter the crisis.
(First published as “Baltikum: Kein Ende der Krise in Sicht”, in: Wochenbericht des 
DIW Berlin Nr. 40/2009.)